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177 
Note 
Mortgage Borrowing: A Comparative 
Analysis of National Regulatory 
Approaches to Loans and Lenders in 
Canada and the United States 
Lucas Frasz* 
The United States’ recent experience with escalating home 
mortgage default and foreclosure rates is cause for great 
concern.  Home ownership is regarded as a pillar of the 
traditional American dream, and for many homeowners their 
home is their single greatest asset.  In exploring what can be 
done to stem the growing tide of defaults and foreclosures which 
are inhibiting the ability of many Americans to realize their 
dream of home ownership, it is useful to compare the approach 
of the United States with the approach of its neighbor to the 
north.  While Canada’s market structures and political 
institutions are similar to those of the United States, Canadian 
homeowners have not been subject to the rapid increase in 
default and foreclosure rates, and have not been exposed to the 
related growth in the subprime lending market. 
The first part of this Note lays out the some of the 
approaches Canada and the United States take in regulating 
mortgage loans and the mortgage lending business.  This section 
also discusses the recent experiences of these countries in terms 
of the size and growth of subprime lending markets, and the 
corresponding rates of mortgage default and foreclosure.  The 
second part of this Note contrasts the Canadian and American 
approaches, identifying the most important disparities between 
these regulatory frameworks and suggesting where the 
approach of one country has a comparative advantage over that 
of the other.  Finally, this Note concludes that the Canadian 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, University of 
Minnesota. 
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model has several important advantages in the areas of cost of 
credit disclosure regimes, mortgage broker registration and 
oversight frameworks, and limitations on the availability of 
mortgage loan products.  Although regulatory efforts in these 
areas alone cannot represent a comprehensive approach to 
reform of the mortgage lending industry in the United States, 
the Canadian model can be of some use in improving the 
experiences of U.S. mortgage loan consumers. 
I.  NATIONAL REGULATORY APPROACHES  
& RECENT EXPERIENCES 
A.  THE CANADIAN APPROACH 
Much like the United States, Canada’s system of 
government is federal in nature.  Under the Canadian 
Constitution, power is shared between the central Canadian 
government and the provincial or territorial governments, with 
each having its own realm of authority.1  This system of dual 
sovereignty is relevant to Canada’s approach to mortgage 
borrowing and predatory lending.  Under the Canadian 
Constitution the federal government has the exclusive authority 
to legislate on matters of financial interest,2 while provincial 
authorities have the power to make laws in relation to property 
and civil rights.3  Accordingly, both federal and provincial 
legislatures have a realm of authority by which they can 
address the problems created by abusive lending practices.  
However, as the Canadian Center for Elder Law has noted, 
“[n]either of these sources contains a statute that is geared to 
address concerns about predatory lending.  Instead, rules of 
general application (some of which are very old) must be fitted 
to a given situation.”4 
 
 1. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 91 (U.K.), as reprinted in 
R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985) (“It shall be lawful for the Queen . . . to make Laws for 
the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not 
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the 
Legislatures of the Provinces.”). 
 2. Id. § 91(19). 
 3. Id. § 92, 92(13) (“In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make 
Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter 
enumerated; that is to say . . .  Property and Civil Rights in the Province.”). 
 4. CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, STUDY PAPER ON PREDATORY LENDING ISSUES IN 
CANADA 8–9 (2008) [hereinafter CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW]. The Canadian Center 
for Elder Law is a non-profit charitable organization that addresses legal issues 
pertinent to the lives of Canada’s elderly citizens, and seeks to influence legal 
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Under its authority to legislate on matters of interest, 
Canada’s federal legislature has adopted two laws designed to 
combat abusive lending practices: the Interest Act and the 
creation of criminal interest rate under the usury laws.5  The 
primary goals of the Interest Act6 are to require adequate cost of 
credit disclosure for loans secured by real property,7 limit 
penalties on late payments,8 and limit penalties on pre-
payments.9  The efficacy of this law in combating abusive 
lending has been questioned by suggestions that it was adopted 
in response to lending practices which are no longer relevant 
and that court cases have significantly limited its scope.10  The 
utility of the criminal interest rate provisions in combating 
abusive lending practices is also unclear.  The Canadian 
Criminal Code11 defines criminal interest as “an effective 
annual rate of interest . . . that exceeds sixty per cent . . . .”12  
However, as the Canadian Center for Elder Law has stated, it 
would be unusual for a lender to structure a mortgage loan in 
violation of the clear prohibition of this section.13 
In the absence of more substantial protections against 
predatory lending at the federal level, Canadian borrowers may 
have to turn to provincial legislation for remedies when they fall 
 
reforms to benefit elder rights issues.  See Canadian Center for Elder Law, About, 
http://www.bcli.org/ccel/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
 5. CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 9–12. 
 6. Interest Act, R.S.C., ch. I-15 (1985) (Can.). 
 7. See id. § 6 (“[N]o interest whatever shall be chargeable, payable or 
recoverable on any part of the principal money advanced, unless the 
mortgage . . . contains a statement showing the amount of the principal money and 
the rate of interest chargeable thereon, calculated yearly or half-yearly, not in 
advance.”). 
 8. See id. § 8(1) (limiting the interest chargeable on payments in arrears to 
that chargeable against the principal not in arrears). 
 9. See id. § 10 (stating that, on mortgages with terms in excess of five years, 
borrowers are entitled to pay the balance of principal and interest charges accrued 
to the time of payment and by doing so avoid future interest charges, but requiring a 
payment of three months future interest to take advantage of this provision). 
 10. CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 10 (“The Interest Act was 
primarily aimed at some very specific abusive practices that . . . are merely of 
historical concern today . . . .  A stream of court cases has served to limit its scope 
even further.”). 
 11. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.). 
 12. Id. § 347(2). 
 13. CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 11 (“The section could be of use 
in egregious cases of predatory lending, but it would probably be a rare lender that 
would deliberately structure a mortgage loan carrying an annual rate of interest 
over 60 percent.”). 
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victim to abusive lending practices in the mortgage market.14  
For the purpose of demonstrating typical consumer protection 
laws enacted by provincial legislatures, this Note focuses on the 
laws of British Columbia.  British Columbia is home to more 
than 4,380,300 people, over 13% of Canada’s population, making 
it the third most populous province.15  Additionally, it boasts the 
fourth highest growth rate among Canadian provinces and 
territories, growing faster than both of the more populated 
provinces of Ontario and Quebec.16  This high growth rate seems 
likely to exacerbate the problems caused by lax consumer 
protection regimes in the mortgage lending market.  The 
Canadian Center for Elder Law has identified four provincial 
legislative enactments that may be effective in combating 
abusive lending practices: (1) cost of credit disclosure laws, (2) 
unconscionable acts and practices laws, (3) the Mortgage 
Brokers Act, and (4) the Financial Institutions Act.17  This Note 
will focus on the first three of these enactments, as the utility of 
the Financial Institutions Act in combating predatory lending 
seems doubtful.18 
Under the cost of credit disclosure provisions in the 
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act,19 a creditor 
entering into a fixed credit agreement, including a mortgage 
loan, must make substantial initial disclosures regarding a wide 
range of terms, from the annual interest rate and method of 
compounding interest to the conditions under which the 
borrower may make pre-payments.20  Additionally, if the 
interest rate on the loan is a floating rate, the lender must 
provide the borrower an annual statement disclosing the 
 
 14. The Canadian Center for Elder Law has concluded that, “[t]he past 30 
years have seen a steady drain of initiative in this area from the federal to the 
provincial level.” CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 12 (citing Jacob Ziegel, 
Is Canadian Consumer Law Dead?, 24 CAN. BUS. L.J. 417 (1994–1995)). 
 15. See STATISTICS CAN., REPORT ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN CANADA 
2005 AND 2006, at 6 (2008). 
 16. See id. 
 17. CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 12. 
 18. See id. at 17 (“The prohibition against unfair contracts under the Financial 
Institutions Act is of unknown value, especially given its apparent lack of use to 
date.  It must be borne in mind that many predatory lenders are not credit unions, 
trust companies, or insurance companies and therefore fall outside the scope of this 
Act.”). 
 19. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2, §§ 66–
70 (B.C.). 
 20. See id. § 84(a)–(r) (detailing requirements of the initial disclosure 
statements).  This provision could also fairly be characterized as a “truth-in-lending 
law.”  See CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 13. 
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effective interest rate.21  For interest rates that are not floating, 
but which are subject to increase, similar disclosure 
requirements apply.22  Several other miscellaneous reporting 
requirements are imposed by this statute,23 creating a broad-
based disclosure regime aimed at informing consumers of 
mortgage loans about the terms of their agreements.  The 
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act also contains 
provisions relating to deceptive acts or practices on the part of 
borrowers.24  This Act gives Canadian courts a considerable 
degree of latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in cases 
where deceptive acts or practices have been found.25  
Additionally, these provisions have the effect of shifting the 
burden of proof to the lender whenever a charge of violation of 
this Act is levied against it.26 
The Mortgage Brokers Act27 creates a system of oversight of 
persons engaged in both lending money under mortgage 
instruments and arranging these transactions.28  Under the Act, 
once the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers has received a sworn 
complaint the Registrar may investigate into a wide range of the 
broker’s affairs, including the broker’s books, reports, 
communications, and transactions.29  Following an 
 
 21. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2, § 85(1) 
(B.C.). 
 22. Id.  § 85(2). 
 23. See, e.g., id. §§ 86–87, 89 (discussing disclosure requirements for increases 
in outstanding principals, amendments, and mortgage loan renewals). 
 24. See id. §§ 4–10; see also CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW, supra note 4, at 14 
(discussing unconscionable or deceptive acts or practices legislation in force in 
British Columbia).  For the purposes of the Act, “deceptive act or practice” is defined 
as “(a) an oral, written, visual, descriptive or other representation by a supplier, or 
(b) any conduct by a supplier that has the capability, tendency or effect of deceiving 
or misleading a consumer or guarantor.”  Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2, § 4(1) (2004) (B.C.). 
 25. See Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2 § 
10(2) (B.C.) (allowing the court to set aside or alter all or part of an agreement made, 
or suspend the rights and obligations of the parties, among other remedies). 
 26. Id. § 9(2) (“If it is alleged that a supplier committed or engaged in an 
unconscionable act or practice, the burden of proof that the unconscionable act or 
practice was not committed or engaged in is on the supplier.”). 
 27. Mortgage Brokers Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 313 (1996) (B.C.). 
 28. The Mortgage Broker’s Act uses a broad definition of “mortgage broker” 
that reaches a large variety of individuals involved in this business.  Among other 
activities that cause one to be labeled a “mortgage broker” are holding oneself out as 
such, buying or selling mortgage instruments, earning in excess of $1,000 per year 
as consideration for arranging mortgages, or lending money on the security of ten or 
more mortgages.  See id. § 1. 
 29. See id. § 6(2). 
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investigation, the Registrar may suspend or cancel the broker’s 
registration for a variety of reasons, such as a finding that “the 
person is a party to a mortgage transaction which is harsh and 
unconscionable or otherwise inequitable.”30  Notably, however, 
the Registrar is unable to disclose whether a particular 
mortgage broker is under investigation,31 leaving borrowers 
vulnerable to unscrupulous lenders while investigations are 
underway. 
The federal and provincial legislation detailed above seems 
to be aimed at fully informing Canadian consumers about the 
loan products they are receiving, and regulating the behavior of 
the mortgage industry professionals who are responsible for 
delivering those products to the borrowers.  In addition, certain 
other restrictions have the practical effect of constraining and 
limiting the types of mortgage instruments that are marketed to 
Canadian home buyers.  The Canadian Bank Act32 prohibits 
banks from issuing mortgage loans for home purchases where 
more than 80% of the value of the home is being financed.33  
However, an exception is made for loans where the amount in 
excess of this statutory limit on financing is secured by 
mortgage insurance from a Canadian government agency or 
authorized insurer.34  In general, a home buyer will still be 
required to make a 5% down payment on the residence to 
qualify for mortgage insurance.35  However, on dwellings with 
more than two units a 10% down payment is required to 
qualify.36  Presumably, the effect of these mortgage insurance 
requirements is to ensure that homeowners establish some 
degree of equity investment in their homes. 
 
 30. Id. § 8(1)(c). 
 31. Fin. Inst. Comm’n, The Role of the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers, 
http://www.fic.gov.bc.ca/responsibilities/mortgagebrokers/overview.htm (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2009) (“The Registrar can not disclose if a mortgage broker is under 
investigation.”). 
 32. Bank Act, 2009 S.C., ch. 46 (Can.). 
 33. Id. § 418 (1) (“A bank shall not make a loan in Canada on the security of 
residential property . . . if the amount of the loan . . . would exceed 80 percent of the 
value of the property at the time of the loan.”). 
 34. See id. § 418(2), (2)(b) (“Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of . . .  a 
loan if repayment of the amount of the loan that exceeds the maximum amount set 
out in subsection (1) is guaranteed or insured by a government agency or a private 
insurer approved by the Superintendent.”). 
 35. Can. Mortgage and Housing Corp., General Requirements, 
http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/co/moloin/moloin_003.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
 36. Id. 
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B.  THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
At the time of the 2006 Canadian Census, 68.4% of 
Canadian households owned their homes, representing the 
highest rate of homeownership since 1971.37  Of those 
households owning their home, 57.9% had a mortgage, 
representing the highest proportion of mortgage holders since 
1981.38  Thus, it appears that home ownership plays an 
important role in the lives of most Canadians and that 
Canadian home purchases are increasingly being accomplished 
through long-term financing.  In addition, home purchase rates 
in Canada appear to be on the rise.  The Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation reported that in 2007, 7% of all households 
reported buying a home in the previous year, up from 6% of 
households in 2006.39  Notwithstanding these high rates of 
homeownership, rates of mortgage default in Canada appear to 
be below 1% across all lending categories.40  While the subprime 
default rates are considerably higher than prime default rates, 
at 2.1%, they still remain relatively low.41  Additionally, 
subprime borrowers account for only about 5% of all mortgages 
written in Canada,42 further reducing the impact of defaults on 
the Canadian economy. 
C.  THE AMERICAN APPROACH 
In many ways, the United States’ approach to mortgage 
loans and lenders has been similar to that of Canada.  At least 
two prominent federal laws provide cost of credit disclosure 
schemes that are applicable to the mortgage lending industry.  
The first of these is the Truth in Lending Act, which was 
enacted in 1968.43  The stated purpose of the Truth in Lending 
 
 37. STATISTICS CAN., CHANGING PATTERNS IN HOMEOWNERSHIP AND SHELTER 
COSTS, 2006 CENSUS 6 (2006). 
 38. Id. 
 39. CAN. MORTGAGE AND HOUS. CORP., RENOVATION AND HOME PURCHASE 
REPORT 7 (2008). 
 40. Janet Whitman, Housing Slump Deepens, NAT’L POST (Can.), Oct. 9, 2008, 
at FP5 (“In Canada, there are signs the real-estate market is slowing, but that 
mortgage defaults aren’t expected to become commonplace.”). 
 41. Paul Brent, How Canada Avoids U.S. Problems, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 
2007, at F07 (comparing the mortgage default experiences of the United States and 
Canada). 
 42. The U.S. Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Will it Spread to Canada?  CBC 
NEWS, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/personalfinance/mortgage-
meltdown.html. 
 43. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006). 
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Act is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit . . . .”44  This law specifically applies to mortgages in 
which the points and fees payable at or before closing exceed 8% 
of the total loan amount, or $400.45  While the Truth in Lending 
Act does not itself set specific disclosure requirements, it 
requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(the Board) to do so.46  The Act allows the Board to provide for 
adjustments and exceptions for certain types of transactions as 
determined by the Board, but specifically exempts qualifying 
mortgage transactions from this grant of discretionary 
authority.47  The regulations promulgated by the Board to 
implement the Truth in Lending Act are known collectively as 
Regulation Z.48  Under Regulation Z, creditors are required to 
make initial disclosures clearly and conspicuously in writing 
and in a form that the borrower can retain.49  Specific 
disclosures and terms are made applicable to home equity lines 
of credit,50 variable-rate mortgages,51 and closed-end home 
mortgages.52 
In addition to the Truth in Lending Act, protections are 
afforded to home loan consumers by the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA).53  Rather than focusing on disclosure 
of the general terms of the mortgage loan, RESPA seeks to 
address the abusive terms that were increasingly imposed at 
 
 44. Id. § 1601(a). 
 45. Id. § 1602(aa)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 46. See id. § 1604(a) (“The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the 
purposes of this subchapter.”). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2009) (stating that the regulation was 
promulgated to implement the Federal Truth in Lending Act). 
 49. Id. § 226.5(a)(1) (“The creditor shall make the disclosures required by this 
subpart clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may 
keep.”). 
 50. See id. § 226.5b(d)(3) (requiring creditors to disclose, among other things, a 
statement that the creditor is acquiring a security interest in the consumer’s 
dwelling and that the consumer may lose their dwelling in the event of defaulting on 
the loan). 
 51. See id. § 226.19(b) (mandating disclosure of the terms by which the interest 
rate is determined and the frequency of interest rate and payment changes). 
 52. See id. § 226.32(d) (prohibiting the imposition of balloon payments, 
negative amortizations, increased interest rates following a default, and pre-
payment penalties on most loans). 
 53. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 
(2006). 
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settlement of the loan.54  Specifically, RESPA prohibits kickback 
arrangements for business referrals on products and services of 
“federally related” mortgage loans.55  Presumably, kickback 
arrangements constrain competition for loan products and 
services, raising the overall cost of borrowing.  RESPA provides 
for serious criminal penalties upon a violation, including up to 
$10,000 in fines and one year in prison.56  Additionally, RESPA 
does not preempt more stringent state regulation in this area.57  
Thus, federal legislation has been aimed at fully informing 
consumers of the terms of their loans, and prohibiting lenders 
from engaging in specifically enumerated abusive practices. 
In stark contrast to the division of regulatory frameworks 
found in Canada’s federal and provincial system, state 
legislative attempts to impose disclosure regimes have been 
limited in effect by the policies of federal regulators.  In 2003, in 
response to the state of Georgia’s efforts to regulate National 
City Bank, the Department of Treasury, through the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, issued a preemption order 
stating that nationally chartered banks would not be subject to 
the fair lending laws promulgated by state legislatures.58  
Accordingly, if states are going to play a role in regulating 
unfair or deceptive issuance of home loans, they will likely have 
to address the issue from another perspective. 
Many states have decided to take up this battle using 
licensing statutes which require mandatory registration of 
 
 54. See id. § 2601(a) (“The Congress finds that significant reforms in the real 
estate settlement process are needed to insure that consumers . . . are protected 
from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that 
have developed in some areas of the country.”). 
 55. See id. § 2607(a) (“No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, 
kickback, or thing of value . . . that business incident to or a part of a real estate 
settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to 
any person.”).  The term “federally related mortgage” is broadly defined, and 
includes loans made, in whole or in part, by creditors insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, or that are intended to be sold to a federal housing 
corporation.  See id. § 2602(1). 
 56. Id. § 2607(d)(1). 
 57. Id. § 2607(d)(6) (“No provision of State law or regulation that imposes more 
stringent limitations on affiliated business arrangements shall be construed as 
being inconsistent with this section.”). 
 58. See Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46264-02 (Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, Dep’t. of the Treasury Aug. 5, 2003) (exempting 
National City Bank from operation of the Georgia Fair Lending Act based on 
principals of supremacy, finding that nationally chartered banks derive their 
authority from federal law). 
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brokers doing business within the state.59  As a key link 
between mortgage products and consumers, mortgage brokers 
play an important role in the way that many consumers access 
these products.  Accordingly, regulation of mortgage brokers can 
be a vital tool in promoting fair lending practices.  For purposes 
of comparison, the focus here will be on Minnesota’s version of 
broker registration, the Minnesota Mortgage Originator and 
Servicer Licensing Act.60  Under this framework, the 
Commissioner of Commerce is given broad authority to regulate 
participants in the mortgage lending industry.61  Additionally, 
mortgage lenders and servicers operating within the state are 
required to abide by a standard of conduct which is made 
operative through a long list of prohibited practices.62  Mortgage 
brokers are also subjected to a fiduciary duty of care through the 
creation of an agency relationship with the borrower.63  Finally, 
the statute gives a private right of action and offers courts 
several categories of remedial damages to award.64 
Finally, the United States mortgage market is notable for 
its less stringent controls on the amount a mortgage loan 
consumer may borrower relative to the value of their home.  
Although private banks require a borrower to obtain private 
mortgage insurance on loans in excess of 80% of the market 
value of the home,65 government housing corporations Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, until recently, would purchase loans that 
 
 59. Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust—Mortgage Licensing Statutes 
Addressing Predatory Lending, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
332, 338 (2005) (stating that most states have such laws, and while they have 
historically been aimed at registration, they are increasingly imposing duties on the 
part of brokers toward their clients). 
 60. Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act, MINN. STAT.  
§§ 58.01–.18 (2007). 
 61. See id. § 58.12 (establishing that, among other remedies, the commissioner 
may bar any person from engaging in residential mortgage origination or servicing). 
 62. Among other prohibitions, mortgage lenders and servicers are prohibited 
from making mortgages with intent that the borrower not repay it, resulting in 
foreclosure, arranging for a mortgage which is less advantageous than the borrower 
could have qualified for, or “churning,” where a new loan provides no tangible or 
reasonable benefit to the borrower over their existing loan.  Id. § 58.13. 
 63. Id. § 58.161 (“A mortgage broker shall be considered to have created an 
agency relationship with the borrower in all cases . . . . ”). 
 64. Id. § 58.18 (mandating an award of actual and incidental damages, 
statutory damages, punitive damages where appropriate, and court costs and 
attorneys’ fees). 
 65. See Sarah Max, Home Buying With No Money Down, CNN.COM, Dec. 23, 
2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/12/23/pf/yourhome/nodownpayment/ (“[P]rivate lenders 
still require that borrowers who put down less than 20 percent pay PMI, which 
protects them if you default on your loan.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  12:30 PM 
2010] REGULATING MORTGAGE BORROWING 187 
 
were up to 103% of the market value of the home.66  
Government agencies, including the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), have been accused of fostering 
irresponsible policies toward the issuance of loans to borrowers 
who were unable to repay, in order to increase access to home 
loans for low-income families.67 
D.  THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
In 1994, the ratio of subprime mortgages to all originations 
was around 5%,68 making the size of the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market comparable to that of Canada.69  A mere two 
years later, the ratio of subprime originations to all mortgages 
had grown to 9%.70  The growth in subprime lending continued, 
and in 1999 one source estimated the ratio of subprime 
originations at 13%.71  By 2000, the ratio had reached an 
astounding 20% of the entire market for mortgage loans.72  
Accordingly, the U.S. mortgage market has become much more 
heavily leveraged with subprime debt than the Canadian 
market.73 
In 2007, delinquency rates on subprime mortgages were 
reported at 16%, triple the delinquency rate on subprime loans 
just two years earlier.74  In January of 2008, the number of 
subprime loans in delinquency had reportedly risen to 21% and 
 
 66. See id. (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would lend up to 103% of 
the home’s value in order to cover closing costs associated with the purchase). 
 67. See Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. 
POST, June 10, 2008, at A1 (“[HUD] neglected to examine whether borrowers could 
make the payments on the loans that Freddie and Fannie classified as affordable.”). 
 68. Jay MacDonald, Watch out for Bad-Loan Signals, BANKRATE.COM, June 15, 
2004, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20040615a1.asp. 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 42.  
 70. See Veena Trehan, The Mortgage Market: What Happened?, NPR.ORG,  
Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12561184 
(“Subprime loans expanded to 20 percent of the mortgage market in 2006, from 9 
percent a decade earlier.”). 
 71. See MacDonald, supra note 68. 
 72. See Trehan, supra note 70. 
 73. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 74. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Economic Club of New York: The Recent Financial Turmoil and Its 
Economic and Policy Consequences (Oct. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071015a.htm (“The 
rate of serious delinquencies has risen notably for subprime mortgages with 
adjustable rates, reaching nearly 16 percent in August, roughly triple the recent low 
in mid-2005.”). 
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foreclosure rates were rising as well.75  By May of 2008, the 
delinquency rate was around a staggering 25% among subprime 
borrowers.76 
E.  SUMMARY 
Both Canada and the United States have approached the 
issue of regulating mortgage loans and mortgage lenders from a 
variety of angles.  Federal and provincial/state legislation 
supplement one another to address the issues of cost of credit 
disclosure, imposition of unfair fees and interest rates, and 
licensing and supervision of persons and institutions involved in 
lending on the security of residential property.  Nonetheless, 
these two countries have experienced vastly disparate rates of 
delinquency and foreclosure, especially in subprime lending 
markets.  Inquiring more closely into the terms and 
implementation of the regulatory frameworks in Canada and 
the United States offers insight into this disconnect. 
II.  COMPARING THE APPROACHES OF CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
A.  COST OF CREDIT DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
As noted above, both Canada and the United States have 
implemented statutory cost of credit disclosure regimes that 
require lenders to inform borrowers of certain loan terms before 
they enter into a mortgage loan.  In the abstract, consumers 
who have greater access to the terms of their borrowing 
transactions and the obligations they incur should be better able 
to select an appropriate loan package for themselves.  Informed 
mortgage loan consumers should also be better able to compare 
the terms of various loan offers in order to select the most 
advantageous offers and root out those with unfair terms.77  If 
 
 75. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Women in Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: 
Financial Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm. 
 76. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Columbia Business School’s 32nd Annual Dinner: Mortgage 
Delinquencies and Foreclosures (May 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20080505a.htm (“About 
one quarter of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages are currently 90 days or more 
delinquent or in foreclosure.”). 
 77. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (stating that the 
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Canada’s success, vis-à-vis the United States, in controlling the 
growth of the subprime lending market and default and 
foreclosure rates can be attributed to a more robust or more 
effective cost of credit disclosure regime, the United States may 
benefit from modeling the Canadian regime where Canada’s 
federal and provincial legislation provides greater efficacy. 
In enforcing the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is vested with broad powers to 
equitably resolve disputes over inadequate disclosures.  The Act 
gives the FTC the authority and responsibility to ensure 
compliance.78  The enforcement mechanisms available to the 
FTC include adjustment of the terms of the loan if the actual 
terms of the loan differ from those terms disclosed to the 
consumer in advance.79  In addition, creditors who knowingly 
and willfully violate the disclosure requirements of the Truth in 
Lending Act may be subject to criminal liability for their 
conduct.  The Act provides for imposition of a fine up to $5,000, 
up to one year imprisonment, or both.80 
British Columbia’s Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Consumer Protection Act”), discussed above, 
also provides a remedial clause.  The Consumer Protection Act 
provides that a creditor who violates terms of the Act must 
compensate the borrower for the loss sustained.81  The Act also 
provides that the amount of losses owed to the borrower may be 
set off against any money then due and payable under the loan 
and against the principal owed on the loan.82  Initially, this 
statute seems to be somewhat less punitive than its counterpart 
in the United States, the Truth in Lending Act.83  However, 
another section of the Consumer Protection Act provides an 
additional means by which a borrower may obtain damages.  
 
Truth in Lending Act is intended to facilitate the informed use of credit, allowing 
borrowers to compare the various credit terms available to them and to protect the 
borrower against unfair practices). 
 78. Id. § 1607(c) (“All of the functions and powers of the Federal Trade 
Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the 
Commission to enforce compliance by any person with the requirements imposed 
under this subchapter . . . .”). 
 79. Id. § 1607(e)(1)–(2) (allowing the Commission to require an adjustment of 
finance charges and interest rates so that the consumer does not pay an amount or a 
percentage which is in excess of the term actually disclosed). 
 80. Id. § 1611. 
 81. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2,  
§ 105(1) (B.C.). 
 82. Id. § 105(1)–(2). 
 83. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1611 (2006). 
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Under the damages section, borrowers can seek equitable 
remedies including injunctions against the creditor, and return 
of any property that was acquired by the creditor as a result of 
the contravention of the Act.84  Additionally, in a court 
proceeding for equitable relief, courts are directed to favor the 
interests of consumers over the interest of businesses.85  
Accordingly, it will be easier for Canadian consumers victimized 
by unfair trade practices to obtain injunctive relief when a 
violation of the cost of credit disclosure regime is established. 
Despite the fact that British Columbia’s Consumer 
Protection Act affords courts great latitude in fashioning 
appropriate relief for violations of its disclosure requirements, it 
seems, at first, hard to argue that the Truth in Lending Act is 
any less deterrent in its operation, given that it provides for 
potential criminal liability in addition to judicial alteration of 
loan terms.  However, while the potential for damages and 
injunctive relief provides an effective deterrent against 
unscrupulous behavior by lenders in Canada, penalties under 
the Truth in Lending Act may do little to discourage 
institutional lenders who ultimately cannot be imprisoned.  
Nonetheless, if the remedies allowed by these cost of credit 
disclosure statutes cannot account for disparate experiences in 
the United States and Canada, a closer look into the substance 
of the disclosure requirements imposed by each is warranted. 
With regard to the timing of required disclosure statements, 
the Consumer Protection Act of British Columbia provides that 
the required disclosures must be made at least two days prior 
the date on which the borrower incurs any obligation to the 
creditor in relation to the mortgage loan.86  By way of contrast, 
Regulation Z requires that the disclosures be made prior to the 
consummation of the transaction, or within three days of 
receiving the borrower’s application.87  While the timing of the 
disclosures under British Columbia’s Consumer Protection Act 
will always result in the borrower receiving the disclosures with 
sufficient time to review the terms before consummation of the 
agreement, the Truth in Lending Act appears to allow a lender 
 
 84. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2, § 171 
(B.C.). 
 85. Id. § 172(5)(a) (“[T]he court must give greater weight and the balance of 
convenience to the protection of consumers than to the carrying on of the business of 
a supplier . . . .”). 
 86. Id. § 66(3). 
 87. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(b), 226.19(a) (applying to both mortgage 
and closed-end credit transactions). 
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to spring the disclosure statement on the borrower just prior to 
the signing of the documents.  Borrowers are entitled to read 
through the provisions prior to consummating the deal, but this 
puts those borrowers at a disadvantage in terms of having 
sufficient time to reflect on the loan terms and comparison shop.  
Imposing a timing requirement for disclosure statements which 
ensures that consumers will have adequate time to review their 
agreement, such as the two-day advance period imposed by 
British Columbia, is one way to provide for more integrity in the 
United States’ mortgage lending market. 
In other respects, these cost of credit disclosure regimes 
differ only slightly in substance, and where they do it is often 
the case that the requirements of the United States’ Truth in 
Lending Act seem more likely to affect full disclosure to 
consumers than British Columbia’s Consumer Protection Act.  
For example, the regulations implementing the Truth in 
Lending Act require that the disclosures under that Act “shall 
be grouped together, shall be segregated from everything else, 
and shall not contain any information not directly related to the 
disclosures required . . . .”88  Under the Consumer Protection 
Act, “[a] disclosure statement or a statement of account may be 
a separate document or part of another document.”89  There 
seems to be an advantage to requiring that the disclosure 
statements be made as part of a separate document in order to 
make them more conspicuous and more likely to be noticed and 
reviewed by the consumer.  Since British Columbia’s approach 
affords the lender more discretion in determining how to 
present the required disclosures to the borrower, it seems more 
susceptible to the opportunistic behaviors of predatory lenders 
who would likely seek to minimize the consumer’s interaction 
with the materials.  In this regard, it would not seem advisable 
for the United States to adopt an approach similar to that of 
British Columbia to supplant its current requirement of 
separate provision of the required disclosures. 
In changing the approach of the United States’ cost of credit 
disclosure regime, it would be best to focus on those reforms 
providing consumers with required disclosures farther in 
advance than current regulations require, and revising the 
remedial portions of the Act to reflect the reality that 
institutional lenders will not be deterred by the threat of 
 
 88. Id. § 226.17(a). 
 89. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 2004 S.B.C., ch. 2, § 67(2) 
(B.C.). 
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criminal penalties.  In this regard, it may be more effective to 
increase the potential civil liability and supplement the ability 
of courts to fashion equitable relief, similar to the abilities of 
courts under British Columbia’s Consumer Protection Act.90  
Additionally, the United States could create a presumption in 
favor of the consumer or require courts to favor the interests of 
consumers over those of businesses as British Columbia has 
done by legislative enactment.91  In short, greater attention to 
adequate and timely disclosure of information and more 
effective and responsive remedial action by courts for violations 
of disclosure requirements may play an important part in 
reducing the number of homes in the United States subject to 
default and foreclosure proceedings. 
B.  MORTGAGE BROKER LICENSING REGIMES 
In addition to the cost of credit disclosure regimes noted 
above, both Canada and the United States rely on mortgage 
broker licensing statutes to combat abusive lending practices 
which are more likely to result in default and foreclosure 
proceedings.  By imposing registration requirements on 
individuals and institutions who are involved in the 
procurement of home mortgage financing, these statutes make it 
possible to oversee the conduct of these actors.  If it can be 
shown that the mortgage broker licensing regimes used in 
Canada are more robust or extensive than those used in the 
United States, this may suggest that the United States should 
follow Canada’s lead in subjecting these actors to heightened 
oversight and discipline for conduct that falls outside of 
permissible norms. 
As noted above, this Note focuses on the mortgage broker 
licensing regimes of Minnesota as representative of how these 
regimes operate in the United States.  That framework will be 
contrasted with the Mortgage Brokers Act of British Columbia.  
The Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act 
(Minnesota Mortgage Originator Act) requires that certain 
persons obtain a license from the Commissioner prior to 
engaging the mortgage origination and servicing transactions.  
However, there are important limitations on who is required to 
 
 90. See id. § 171 (allowing a person injured by a contravention of the Consumer 
Protection Act to bring suit against a supplier, reporting agency, collector, bailiff, or 
licensed broker). 
 91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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register under this Act.  The statute creates two classes of 
licensed persons, mortgage originators and mortgage servicers.92  
Only business associations that are also approved as mortgagees 
by HUD or the Federal National Mortgage Association can 
qualify as mortgage originators.93  Accordingly, individual actors 
are only reached through the mortgage servicer licensing 
requirements.  There is an important limitation on the scope of 
both of these licensing requirements.  Both sets of requirements 
exempt financial institutions that are overseen and regulated by 
a federal agency.94  These exemptions from coverage may very 
well be required by principals of supremacy of federal law.  The 
Department of the Treasury has stated that fair lending laws 
enacted by state legislatures cannot be enforced against 
federally chartered banks because those institutions derive their 
authority from federal law.95  It seems very likely that any 
attempt by state legislatures to regulate the lending activities of 
institutions subject to federal oversight would be rejected on 
similar grounds.  As a result the scope of state mortgage broker 
regulation may be limited to this extent in the United States.96 
Unlike its counterpart in the United States, which is 
defined more by exemptions than inclusions, British Columbia’s 
Mortgage Brokers Act uses a broad definition of “mortgage 
broker,” encompassing anyone who lends money, their own or 
someone else’s, in whole or in part secured by a mortgage; 
anyone who receives consideration for arranging such a 
transaction; anyone who holds themselves out to be a broker of 
mortgages; and even anyone who collects money secured by 
mortgages.97  This broader definition is also subject to a 
 
 92. Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act, MINN. STAT.  
§ 58.04 subdivs. 1–2 (2007). 
 93. Id. § 58.04 subdiv. 1(b). 
 94. Id. § 58.04 subdivs. 1(c)(2), 2(b)(4); See also id. § 58.02 subdiv. 10 (“The 
term ‘financial institution’ also includes a subsidiary or operating subsidiary of a 
financial institution or of a bank holding company as defined in the federal Bank 
Holding Company Act . . . if the subsidiary . . . can demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
the commissioner that it is regulated and subject to active and ongoing oversight 
and supervision by a federal banking agency . . . or the commissioner.”). 
 95. See Preemption Determination and Order, supra note 58. 
 96. Notably, although exempted individuals and institutions are not required 
to be registered under the Act, the Act still purports to impose all of the 
requirements of the Act on all the actors exempted.  This may mean that a cause of 
action under Minnesota Mortgage Originator Act still exists against an individual 
who is not required to be registered according to the terms of this section.  See 
Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Act, MINN. STAT. § 58.05 subdiv. 1 
(2007). 
 97. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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narrower set of exemptions,98 ensuring that a broader range of 
non-traditional lenders will fall within the purview of the Act.  
Accordingly, this is an area where the Canadian approach may 
result in a more effective system of oversight and regulation.  
Nonetheless, the approach in Minnesota remains fairly broad, 
and given principles of supremacy, the Minnesota Mortgage 
Brokers Act is probably crafted to be as broad as possible.  
Absent a change in supremacy approaches or the enactment of 
federal mortgage broker registration acts, this is one area where 
the United States approach probably cannot profitably be made 
more similar to that of Canada. 
Beyond the registration requirements, the Minnesota 
Mortgage Originator Act gives plenary powers to the 
Commissioner to take a number of actions against licensees for 
a wide range of conduct that the Commissioner may find 
inconsistent with the obligations of a mortgage originator or 
servicer.  Likewise, under British Columbia’s Mortgage Brokers 
Act, the Registrar is entitled to suspend or cancel an 
individual’s or an institution’s registration for a wide variety of 
reasons.  Under the British Columbia Act, the Registrar may 
take action against a registered broker when he determines that 
there has been a violation of the Act; when there has been a 
violation of certain relevant provisions of the Business Practices 
and Consumer Protection Act (discussed above); when the 
person is a party to an unconscionable or inequitable mortgage 
transaction; or when the person is conducting their business in 
a prejudicial manner.99  Accordingly, the Registrar is able to 
take action against a registered person for a great number of 
transactions that affect the person’s performance as a mortgage 
broker. 
Arguably, however, the Minnesota Mortgage Originators 
Act is even broader in terms of the situations which vest the 
Commissioner with the power to act against a licensee.  As an 
initial step, the Commissioner must find that an order affecting 
the suspension, revocation, or similar sanction, is in the public 
interest.100  This is a standard that will not be difficult to meet 
in the vast majority of situations that meet the requirements of 
the second step.  In the second step, the Commissioner is 
 
 98. See Mortgage Brokers Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 313, § 11 (1996) (B.C.). 
 99. Id. § 8(1)(a)–(f). 
 100. Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Act, MINN. STAT. § 58.12 
subdiv. 1(b) (2007) (“In order to take the action . . . the commissioner must find: (1) 
that the order is in the public interest.”). 
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entitled to suspend or revoke a license for any of the situations 
under which the Registrar may do so under the British 
Columbia Act; and, in addition, for certain conduct unrelated to 
the licensee’s business in the mortgage lending industry.  For 
example, a license may be revoked for any person convicted of a 
crime involving “moral turpitude,”101 engaging in deceptive acts 
or practices—whether or not related to mortgage lending102—or 
even “engaged in an act or practice . . . that demonstrates 
untrustworthiness, financial irresponsibility, or incompetence.”103  
These provisions allow the Commissioner to sanction a licensed 
mortgage broker for almost any undesirable conduct since the 
scope of the situations that trigger the Commissioner’s ability to 
do so extend beyond the mortgage lending business.  This 
should, in theory, give the Commissioner a greater ability to 
“weed out” undesirable characters from the mortgage lending 
industry.104  Since the Minnesota Mortgage Originator Act is 
broader than Mortgage Broker’s Act in this scenario, it would 
not seem advisable to conform the Minnesota Act to its British 
Columbia counterpart. 
In addition to the scope of conduct that triggers the 
Commissioner’s ability to take action against a licensee under 
the Minnesota Mortgage Originator Act, there is an additional 
reason to indicate that the Act is a sufficient measure in 
combating abusive lending when compared to British 
Columbia’s Mortgage Brokers Act.  The Minnesota Mortgage 
Originator Act creates a private right of action for violations of 
its terms.105  Importantly, this private right of action is not 
available against banks, savings banks, or credit unions 
chartered under state or federal law,106 but provides ample 
recourse for borrowers who have been victimized by other actors 
in the mortgage lending process.  Since the extent of damages 
 
 101. See id. § 58.12 subdiv. (b)(2)(vi). 
 102. See id. § 58.12 subdiv. (b)(2)(iv). 
 103. Id. § 58.12 subdiv. (b)(2)(v). 
 104. Thus, an individual performing mortgage origination services, even if not 
technically a mortgage originator himself, could be barred from engaging in future 
mortgage origination services where the individual submitted loan applications with 
false, misleading, or deceptive statements and directed a title company employee to 
falsify title work.  Pomrenke v. Commissioner, 677 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004). 
 105. See Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Act, MINN. STAT. § 58.18 
subdiv. 1 (2007) (“A borrower injured by a violation of the standards, duties, 
prohibitions, or requirements of [this Act] shall have a private right of action . . . .”). 
 106. Id. § 58.18 subdiv. 4. 
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available under this section is very broad,107 it should provide a 
sufficient deterrent effect against violations of the Act, in 
addition to the deterrent effect of likely suspension or revocation 
of the licensee’s license by the Commissioner. 
This is an area where an important difference exists 
between the approach of British Columbia and that of 
Minnesota.  While British Columbia’s Mortgage Broker’s Act 
does not create a private right of action, that Act does provide 
for the imposition of potentially very large civil and criminal 
penalties against an individual or institution found to have 
violated provisions of the Act.  On a first offense, whether the 
violating registrant is a corporation, other business association, 
or an individual, a penalty of up to $100,000 may be imposed, 
and, in the case of an individual, this penalty may be 
supplemented by a term of imprisonment of up to two years.108  
For subsequent offenses, the penalty is increased to $200,000 
per offense, and individuals continue to face the threat of 
imprisonment for up to two years per offense.109  While the 
nature of the available recourse for violations of this law is 
different than under the British Columbia Act, being public 
rather than private, the large amount of monetary penalties 
that an offender faces, in addition to the threat of criminal 
penalties, would seem to be no less deterrent than the private 
right of action that violators face under the Minnesota Mortgage 
Originator Act. 
Although the Minnesota Mortgage Originator Act appears 
to be sufficiently broad and comprehensive in its treatment of 
mortgage broker licensing, there are significant dissimilarities 
between that Act and the Mortgage Brokers Act of British 
Columbia.  In this respect, the British Columbia Act enjoys 
some advantages over the Minnesota Act.  Mortgage broker 
registration and licensing regimes in the United States may 
benefit from the experiences of the Canadian registration 
regimes by seeking to broaden the class of individuals and 
institutions over whom the Act authorizes supervision.  Since 
the Minnesota Act appears to be broader, on its face, than the 
British Columbia Act in terms of what types of conduct vest the 
Commissioner with remedial powers under the Act, it is 
unlikely that the Minnesota Act would benefit from being 
brought closer in line with the British Columbia Act in that 
 
 107. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Mortgage Brokers Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 313, § 22(2) (1996) (B.C.). 
 109. Id. 
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regard.  Finally, the British Columbia Act may enjoy an 
advantage in terms of the penalties that are allowed against 
violating mortgage brokers.  The Minnesota Act could seek to 
impose civil penalties on institutions, and possibly even criminal 
penalties on individuals, in addition to allowing for a private 
right of action when violations of the Act occur. 
III.  ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON LOAN PRODUCTS 
This Note has indicated certain areas in which the 
Canadian approach to regulation of mortgage loans and 
mortgage lenders and brokers has advantages over the 
approaches of the United States at both the federal and state 
levels.  This has included suggestions that the approach of the 
United States could benefit from being brought into line with 
the Canadian approach in terms of mortgage broker licensing 
frameworks and cost of credit disclosure regimes.  This section 
seeks to identify important disparities in the approaches of the 
United States and Canada to regulating the types of mortgage 
loan products that are permitted to be marketed to consumers. 
As discussed above, the Canadian Bank Act is an important 
piece of federal Canadian legislation that has the practical effect 
of restraining the availability of financial products secured by 
residential homes.  Under that Act, borrowers must make a 
large down payment or, alternatively, acquire mortgage 
insurance, and at any rate the borrower will usually need at 
least a 5% down payment.110  Since borrowers will, thus, have at 
least some degree of equity in their home, they will be the first 
to lose on their investment in the event that the loan goes into 
default, the lending institution initiates foreclosure proceedings, 
and the home is sold for less than the full purchase price of the 
home.  In theory this should incentivize conservative borrowing 
since consumers will want to be certain that they can stay 
current with their mortgage obligations.  In addition, when 
mortgage loan consumers find themselves in a situation where 
staying current on their obligations is becoming more difficult, 
this substantial exposure to equity loss should tend to cause 
consumers to address their mortgage loan obligations before 
turning to other creditors.  This ought to limit the number of 
 
 110. See Can. Mortgage and Housing Corp., supra note 35 (“You will typically 
have a down payment of at least 5% of the purchase price of the dwelling, depending 
on the dwelling type.”).  See also supra Part I.A. 
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defaults and resulting foreclosures under Canadian mortgage 
instruments. 
The approach of the United States in this area has been 
decidedly less conservative.  While borrowers in the United 
States are usually required to obtain mortgage insurance on 
loans in excess of 80% of the home’s market value,111 as in the 
Canadian mortgage market, the quasi-governmental entities 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would purchase home mortgage 
loans in the secondary mortgage market for up to 103% of the 
market value of the home.112  It is easy to see the effect of this 
permissive secondary purchase structure on the availability of 
mortgage products to consumers.  Rather than protecting, at a 
minimum, the 5% initial equity rate present in Canadian 
mortgage packages, this lending structure allows borrowers in 
the United States to acquire negative equity.  Borrowers are 
able to owe more on their home loans than the home is worth.  
Accordingly, the incentive structure present in the Canadian 
system, outlined above, is absent from the mortgage market in 
the United States.  In the event that a borrower defaults on her 
loan, the lending institution initiates foreclosure proceedings 
and sells the home at below the purchase price.  A borrower 
with no equity in their home loses nothing personally.  This 
removes the incentive for consumers to borrow conservatively, 
fearing that they will lose their own equity investment in a 
home on which they would not be able to keep up with the 
payments.  Additionally, when the borrower is placed in a 
situation where paying their bills became difficult, that 
borrower may very well be more willing to walk away from the 
home and allow the lending institution to take all of the down-
side on the investment.  Indeed, there is evidence that this is 
what is happening in many of the areas of the United States 
which are being hardest hit by the down-turn in the housing 
market.113 
 
 111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 113. See John Leland, Faced with Mortgage Default, Some U.S. Homeowners 
Walk Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1 (profiling a business that assists 
homeowners in abandoning their homes and mortgage obligations and stating, “In 
an era in which new types of loans allowed many home buyers to move in with little 
or no down payment, and to cash out any equity by refinancing, the meaning of 
homeownership and foreclosure have [sic] changed . . . .”); When Homeowners Walk 
Away: New Research Reveals More Than 25 Percent of Mortgage Loan Defaults Are 
Strategic, REUTERS, June 26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/ 
idUS131544+26-Jun-2009+PRN20090626 [hereinafter When Homeowners Walk 
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While it is true that many borrowers in Canada do not need 
to invest a great deal of equity in their home in order to obtain 
financing, it may be the case that even this minimal amount of 
equity interest in the borrower’s home is an important factor in 
encouraging staying current with one’s mortgage obligations.  
Although not all borrowers in the United States elect to 
purchase their homes with no down payment, that trend is 
growing and the amount of equity investment is diminishing.114  
This is likely an area in which the Canadian approach to 
mortgage lending has significant advantages to the approach of 
the United States in terms of promoting stability and 
conservative borrowing in the mortgage market. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The approaches of Canada and the United States towards 
the regulation and oversight of mortgage loans and mortgage 
lending practices have a great deal in common.  Both 
frameworks seek to protect home mortgage loan consumers from 
unfair and abusive practices by requiring certain disclosures to 
be made to borrowers regarding the cost of credit of the loan 
products being considered.  Both Canada and the United States 
impose certain duties and limitations on the conduct of 
mortgage brokers.  Finally, both countries seek to limit the 
types of loan products that may be offered for sale to consumers 
by imposing mortgage insurance requirements on the proceeds 
of a loan which are in excess of 80% of the secured property’s 
market value at the time the loan is issued.  Notwithstanding 
the substantial overlap of regulatory frameworks between these 
countries, Canada has had substantially less exposure to 
escalating default and foreclosure rates, and has seen 
essentially no growth in the subprime lending market. 
This Note has identified certain contexts in which the 
Canadian approach to mortgage loans and lenders offers 
advantages over the approach of the United States.  In some 
situations, it may be an advantage for the United States, both at 
 
Away] (examining “American homeowners’ propensity to default when the value of a 
mortgage exceeds the value of their house, even if they can afford to pay their 
mortgage.”). 
 114. See When Homeowners Walk Away, supra note 113 (stating that in 2008 
29% of borrowers put no money down, that the median down payment was 9%, 
compared with 20% in 1989, and that the median down payment for first time 
borrowers was only 2%). 
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the federal and state levels, to bring its approach more in line 
with that of Canada.  These instances include broadening the 
scope of the cost of credit disclosure laws to ensure that 
consumers receive disclosure statements sufficiently in advance 
to be able to fully evaluate the loan and any alternatives, 
imposing criminal liability on individual mortgage brokers who 
violate the provisions of applicable mortgage broker registration 
statutes, and imposing more effective caps on the maximum 
loan amounts in order to ensure that borrowers maintain a 
higher degree of equity in their homes.  This Note has addressed 
only a segment of the issues that are relevant to mortgage 
lending, and comprehensive approaches to the rapidly evolving 
crisis in the United States will have to take into account other 
factors, such as the incentives created by the securitization of 
home mortgage loans.  Nevertheless, implementing these 
changes may play an important role in controlling the default 
and foreclosure rates in the United States. 
